

PO3IOG: International Organizations in Global Politics

[View Online](#)

-
- Abbott, K. W., & Snidal, D. (1998). Why States Act through Formal International Organizations. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(1), 3–32.
- Binder, M. (2015). Paths to intervention: What explains the UN's selective response to humanitarian crises? *Journal of Peace Research*, 52(6), 712–726.
- Binder, M., & Heupel, M. (2015). The Legitimacy of the UN Security Council: Evidence from Recent General Assembly Debates. *International Studies Quarterly*, 59(2), 238–250.
- Buchanan, A., & Keohane, R. O. (2006). The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions. *Ethics & International Affairs*, 20(4), 405–437.
- Charnovitz, S. (2006). Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law. *The American Journal of International Law*, 100(2), 348–372.
- Checkel, J. T. (2005). International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework. *International Organization*, 59(4), 801–826.
- Claude, I. L. (1966). Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations. *International Organization*, 20(3), 367–379.
- Ecker-Ehrhardt, M. (2017). Self-legitimation in the face of politicization: Why international organizations centralized public communication. *The Review of International Organizations*, 13(4), 519–546.
- Finnemore, M. (1996). *National interests in international society: Vol. Cornell studies in political economy*. Cornell University Press.
<http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/detail.action?docID=4799675>
- Fioretos, O. (2011). Historical Institutionalism in International Relations. *International Organization*, 65(2), 367–399.
https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/23016816?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
- Golub, J. (1999). In the shadow of the vote? Decision making in the European Community. *International Organization*, 53(4), 733–764.
- Gould, E. R. (2006). Delegating IMF conditionality: understanding variations in control and conformity. In D. G. Hawkins, D. A. Lake, D. L. Nielson, & M. J. Tierney (Eds.), *Delegation and agency in international organizations* (pp. 281–311). Cambridge University Press.

<https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491368>

Gutner, T. (2015). Evaluating the IMF's Performance in the Global Financial Crisis. http://wp.peio.me/wp-content/uploads/PEIO9/102_80_1443647577194_Gutner30Sept2015.pdf

Gutner, T., & Thompson, A. (2010). The politics of IO performance: A framework. *The Review of International Organizations*, 5(3), 227–248.

Haftel, Y. Z., & Thompson, A. (2006). The Independence of International Organizations: Concept and Applications. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 50(2), 253–275.

Hanrieder, T. (2015). The path-dependent design of international organizations: Federalism in the World Health Organization. *European Journal of International Relations*, 21(1), 215–239. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066114530011>

Hawkins, D., Lake, D. A., Nielson, D. L., & Tierney, M. J. (2006). Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal-agent theory. In *Delegation and agency in international organizations: Vol. Political economy of institutions and decisions* (pp. 3–38). Cambridge University Press. <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491368>

Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2009). A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus. *British Journal of Political Science*, 39(1), 1–23. <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/27568377>

Ian Hurd. (2002). Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council. *Global Governance*, 8(1), 35–51.

Johnston, A. I. (2001). Treating International Institutions as Social Environments. *International Studies Quarterly*, 45(4), 487–515.

Jupille, J. H., Mattli, W., & Snidal, D. (2013). *Institutional choice and global commerce*. Cambridge University Press. <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139855990>

Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., & Snidal, D. (2001). The rational design of international institutions. *International Organization*, 55(4), 761–799.

Lipson, M. (2007). Peacekeeping: Organized Hypocrisy? *European Journal of International Relations*, 13(1), 5–34.

Making the most of your online reading lists. (n.d.). <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pu6TKAXic2o>

Mayer, P. (2008). Civil Society Participations in International Security Organizations: The

Cases of NATO and OSCE. In J. Steffek, C. Kissling, & P. Nanz (Eds.), *Civil society participation in European and global governance: a cure for the democratic deficit?* Vol. Transformations of the state (pp. 116–139). Palgrave Macmillan.
<http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/detail.action?docID=370463>

Mearsheimer, J. (n.d.). The False Promise of International Institutions. *International Security*, 19(3), 5–49. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539078>

Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore. (1999). The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations. *International Organization*, 53(4), 699–732.

Morse, J. C., & Keohane, R. O. (2014). Contested multilateralism. *The Review of International Organizations*, 9(4), 385–412.

Pierson, P. (2000). Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics. *American Political Science Review*, 94(02), 251–267. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2586011>

Pierson, P. (2004). *Politics in time: history, institutions, and social analysis*. Princeton University Press. <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/detail.action?docID=768545>

Pollack, M. A. (1997). Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community. *International Organization*, 51(1), 99–134.

Rixen, T., & Zangl, B. (2013). The politicization of international economic institutions in US public debates. *The Review of International Organizations*, 8(3), 363–387.

Scholte, J. A. (Ed.). (2011). *Building global democracy?: civil society and accountable global governance*. Cambridge University Press.
<https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511921476>

Seabrooke, L. (2007). Legitimacy gaps in the world economy: explaining the sources of the IMF's legitimacy crisis. *International Politics (Hague, Netherlands)*, 44(2/3), 250–268.

Tallberg, J., Sommerer, T., Squatrito, T., & Jönsson, C. (2014). Explaining the Transnational Design of International Organizations. *International Organization*, 68(4), 741–774.

Tallberg, J., Sommerer, T., Squatrito, T., & Lundgren, M. (2016). The performance of international organizations: a policy output approach. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 23(7), 1077–1096.

Thompson, A. (2006). Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission. *International Organization*, 60(1), 1–34.

Thompson, A. (2010). *Channels of power: the UN Security Council and U.S. statecraft in Iraq*. Cornell University Press.
<https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/detail.action?docID=3137979>

Torres, H. R. (2007). Reforming the International Monetary Fund: Why its Legitimacy is at Stake. *Journal of International Economic Law*, 10(3), 443–460.

Vaubel, R., Dreher, A., & Soylu, U. (2007). Staff Growth in International Organizations: A Principal-Agent Problem? An Empirical Analysis. *Public Choice*, 133(3), 275–295.

Voeten, E. (2005). The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force. *International Organization*, 59(3), 527–557.

Zaum, D. (Ed.). (2013). *Legitimizing international organizations* (First edition). Oxford University Press.

<https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672097.001.0001>

Zürn, M., Binder, M., & Ecker-Ehrhardt, M. (2015). International authority and its politicization. *International Theory*, 4(1), 69–106.

<https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971912000012>