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———. ‘Ifs, Cans, and Free Will: The Issues’. In The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-8.
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———. Self-Knowledge and Resentment. First Harvard University Press paperback edition. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2012.
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———. ‘Widerker Responsibility and Frankfurt-Type Examples’. In The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, n.d. http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com.idpproxy.reading.ac.uk/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-14.
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———. My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/detail.action?docID=272358.
Fischer, John Martin, and Mark Ravizza. Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Vol. Cambridge studies in philosophy and law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511814594.
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———. ‘The Gist of Excuses’. In Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law, 121–40. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239351.001.0001.
Hart, H. L. A., and John Gardner. Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534777.001.0001.
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———. Persons & Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019515374X.001.0001.
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———. Living without Free Will. Vol. Cambridge studies in philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/detail.action?docID=201440.
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———. ‘“The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility”’. In Free Will, 2nd ed. Vol. Oxford readings in philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
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———. ‘“Freedom and Resentment”’. In Free Will, 2nd ed. Vol. Oxford readings in philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
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———. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983.
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———. Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1994.
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———. ‘“Free Agency”’. In Free Will, 2nd ed. Vol. Oxford readings in philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
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