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David Widerker. 2000. ‘Frankfurt’s Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: A Further Look’, Philosophical Perspectives, 14: 181–201 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2676128?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents>
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Derk Pereboom. 2000. ‘Alternative Possibilities and Causal Histories’, Philosophical Perspectives, 14: 119–37 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2676125?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents>
Douglas Husak. 2005. ‘On the Supposed Priority of Justification to Excuse’, Law and Philosophy, 24.6: 557–94 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/30040364?pq-origsite=summon>
Duff, R. A. 2011. ‘“What Kind of Responsibility Must Criminal Law Presuppose?”’, in Free Will and Modern Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.5871/bacad/9780197264898.001.0001>
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———. 2008. My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 63–83 <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/detail.action?docID=272358>
Fischer, John Martin, and Mark Ravizza. 2000. Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511814594>
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Frankfurt, Harry. 2003a. ‘“Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
———. 2003b. ‘“Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
Gardner, John. 2007a. Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239351.001.0001>
———. 2007b. ‘The Gist of Excuses’, in Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 121–40 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239351.001.0001>
Hart, H. L. A., and John Gardner. 2008. Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534777.001.0001>
Helen Beebee. 2002. ‘Reply to Huemer on the Consequence Argument’, The Philosophical Review, 111.2: 235–41 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/3182620?pq-origsite=summon>
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———. 2003. ‘“Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
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Kapitan, Tomis. 2002. ‘A Master Argument for Incompatibilism?’, in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-6>
———. 2011. ‘“A Master Argument for Incompatibilism?”’, in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.001.0001>
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———. 2003. ‘“Freedom”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
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Nichols, Shaun, and Joshua Knobe. 2008. ‘“Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions”’, in Experimental Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press) <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/reader.action?docID=415292&ppg=118>
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Watson, Gary. 2003a. ‘“Free Agency”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
———. 2003b. Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
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———. 2004. Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays (Oxford: Clarendon Press) <http://idpproxy.reading.ac.uk/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272273.001.0001>
Widerker, David. 2003. ‘“Libertarianism and Frankfurt’s Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
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Wolf, Susan. 2003. ‘“Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
