Alfred R. Mele (2005) ‘A Critique of Pereboom’s “Four-Case Argument” for Incompatibilism’, Analysis, 65(1), pp. 75–80. Available at: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/3329340?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.
Alfred R. Mele and David Robb (1998) ‘Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases’, The Philosophical Review, 107(1), pp. 97–112. Available at: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2998316?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.
Aune, B. and Lehrer, K. (1982) ‘'Cans and Ifs: an Exchange’’, in Free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Austin, J.L. (1979) ‘“A plea for Excuses”’, in J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock. (eds) Philosophical papers. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019283021X.001.0001.
Ayer, J. (1982) ‘“Freedom and Necessity”’, in Free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Beebee, H. (2008) ‘Smilansky’s alleged refutation of compatibilism’, Analysis (Oxford), 68(3), pp. 258–260. Available at: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/25597892.
Berofsky, B. (2002) ‘Ifs, Cans, and Free Will: The Issues’, in The Oxford handbook of free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-8.
Berofsky, B. (2011) ‘“Ifs, Cans, and Free Will: The Isssues”’, in The Oxford handbook of free will. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.001.0001.
Bilgrami, A. (2012a) Self-knowledge and resentment. First Harvard University Press paperback edition. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Bilgrami, A. (2012b) Self-knowledge and resentment. First Harvard University Press paperback edition. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Boxer, K.E. (2013) Rethinking responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695324.001.0001.
Carl Ginet (1996) ‘In Defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: Why I Don’t Find Frankfurt’s Argument Convincing’, Philosophical Perspectives, 10, pp. 403–417. Available at: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2216254?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.
Chisholm, R.M. (2003) ‘“Human Freedom and the Self”’, in Free will. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Clarke, R. (2003) ‘“Toward a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free Will”’, in Free will. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Clarke, R. (no date) ‘Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy [Preprint]. Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-theories/.
Clarke, Randolph (no date) ‘Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy [Preprint]. Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-theories/.
Corrado, M.L. (1994) Justification and excuse in the criminal law: a collection of essays. New York: Garland Publishing.
Darwall, S.L. (2006) The second-person standpoint: morality, respect, and accountability. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
David Widerker (2000) ‘Frankfurt’s Attack on the Principle of Alternative                            Possibilities: A Further Look’, Philosophical Perspectives, 14, pp. 181–201. Available at: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2676128?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.
Dennett, D.C. (1984) Elbow room: the varieties of free will worth wanting. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Derk Pereboom (2000) ‘Alternative Possibilities and Causal                            Histories’, Philosophical Perspectives, 14, pp. 119–137. Available at: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2676125?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.
Douglas Husak (2005) ‘On the Supposed Priority of Justification to Excuse’, Law and Philosophy, 24(6), pp. 557–594. Available at: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/30040364?pq-origsite=summon.
Duff, R.A. (2011) ‘“What Kind of Responsibility Must Criminal Law Presuppose?”’, in Free will and modern science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.5871/bacad/9780197264898.001.0001.
Edited by Robert Kane (no date a) ‘Bernstein Fatalism’, in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Available at: http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com.idpproxy.reading.ac.uk/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-3.
Edited by Robert Kane (no date b) ‘Haji Compatibilist Views of Freedom and Responsibility’, in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Available at: http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com.idpproxy.reading.ac.uk/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-9.
Edited by Robert Kane (no date c) ‘Introduction: The Contours of Contemporary Free Will Debates’, in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Available at: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-1.
Edited by Robert Kane (no date d) ‘Widerker Responsibility and Frankfurt-type Examples’, in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Available at: http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com.idpproxy.reading.ac.uk/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-14.
Ekstrom, L.W. (2000) Free will: a philosophical study. Boulder, Colo: Cumnor Hill.
Ekstrom, L.W. (2002) ‘Libertarianism and Frankfurt-style Cases’, in The Oxford handbook of free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-13.
Eshleman, A. (no date) ‘Moral Responsibility’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, [Preprint]. Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility/.
Feinberg, J. (1968) ‘“Action and Responsibility”’, in The Philosophy of action. London: Oxford University Press, pp. 95–119.
Finch, A. (1998) ‘The Mind argument and libertarianism’, Mind, 107(427), pp. 515–528. Available at: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2660112.
Fischer, J.M. (2007) Four views on free will. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub. Available at: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/detail.action?docID=306543.
Fischer, J.M. (2008) My way: essays on moral responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 63–83. Available at: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/detail.action?docID=272358.
Fischer, J.M. and Ravizza, M. (2000) Responsibility and control: a theory of moral responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Available at: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511814594.
Fisher, J.M. (2003) ‘“Frankfurt-Style Compatibilism”’, in Free will. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Frankfurt, H. (2003a) ‘“Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”’, in Free will. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Frankfurt, H. (2003b) ‘“Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”’, in Free will. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gardner, J. (2007a) Offences and defences: selected essays in the philosophy of criminal law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239351.001.0001.
Gardner, J. (2007b) ‘The Gist of Excuses’, in Offences and defences: selected essays in the philosophy of criminal law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 121–140. Available at: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239351.001.0001.
Hart, H.L.A. and Gardner, J. (2008) Punishment and responsibility: essays in the philosophy of law. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534777.001.0001.
Helen Beebee (2002) ‘Reply to Huemer on the Consequence Argument’, The Philosophical Review, 111(2), pp. 235–241. Available at: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/3182620?pq-origsite=summon.
Honderich, T. (2011) ‘“Determinism as true, both compatibilism and incompatibilism as false, and the real problem”’, in The Oxford handbook of free will. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.001.0001.
Horder, J. (1996) ‘Criminal Law: Between Determinism, Liberalism, and Criminal Justice’, Current Legal Problems, 49(1), pp. 159–186. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/clp/49.1.159.
Horder, J. (2004) Excusing crime. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199225781.001.0001.
Huemer, M. (2000) ‘Van Inwagen’s consequence argument’, The Philosophical review, 109(4), pp. 525–544. Available at: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2693623.
Inwagen, P. van (2003) ‘“An Argument for Incompatibilism”’, in Free will. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
John Martin Fischer (1986) ‘Van Inwagen on Free Will’, The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-), 36(143), pp. 252–260. Available at: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2219772?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.
Kane, R. (2002) The Oxford handbook of free will. New York: Oxford University Press. Available at: http://idpproxy.reading.ac.uk/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001.
Kane, R. (2003) ‘“Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism”’, in Free will. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kane, R. (2005) A contemporary introduction to free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/detail.action?docID=4963976.
Kane, R. (2011) ‘“Introduction: The Contours of Contemporary Free Will Debates”’, in The Oxford handbook of free will. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.001.0001.
Kapitan, T. (2002) ‘A Master Argument for Incompatibilism?’, in The Oxford handbook of free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-6.
Kapitan, T. (2011) ‘“A Master Argument for Incompatibilism?”’, in The Oxford handbook of free will. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.001.0001.
L. Ekstrom (2003) ‘Free Will, Chance, and Mystery’, Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 113(2), pp. 153–180. Available at: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/4321354?pq-origsite=summon.
Lewis, D. (2003) ‘“Are We Free to Break the Laws?”’, in Free will. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McKenna, M. (no date) ‘Compatibilism’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy [Preprint]. Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/.
Nagel, T. (1982) ‘“Moral luck”’, in Free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nagel, T. (2003) ‘“Freedom”’, in Free will. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nagel, Thomas (1970) The possibility of altruism. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
Nahmias, E. (2008) ‘“Is incompatibilism intuitive?”,’ in Experimental philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/reader.action?docID=415292&ppg=94.
Nichols, S. and Knobe, J. (2008) ‘“Moral responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions”’, in Experimental philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/reader.action?docID=415292&ppg=118.
O’Connor, T. (2002a) ‘Libertarian Views: Dualist and Agent-Causal Theories’, in The Oxford handbook of free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-15.
O’Connor, T. (2002b) Persons & causes: the metaphysics of free will. New York: Oxford University Press. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019515374X.001.0001.
O’Connor, T. (no date) ‘Free Will’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy [Preprint]. Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/.
Online reading lists: a guide for students (no date). University of Reading Library. Available at: http://libguides.reading.ac.uk/reading-lists/students.
Ormerod, D., Laird, K., Gibson, M., Ormerod, D. and Smith, J.C. (2024) Smith, Hogan, and Ormerod’s criminal law. Seventeenth edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198890942.001.0001.
Owens, D. (2012) Shaping the normative landscape. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691500.001.0001.
Pereboom, D. (2001a) Living without free will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Available at: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/detail.action?docID=201440.
Pereboom, D. (2001b) Living without free will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Available at: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/detail.action?docID=201440.
Peter van Inwagen (1978) ‘Ability and Responsibility’, The Philosophical Review, 87(2), pp. 201–224. Available at: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2184752?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.
Peter van Inwagen (2000) ‘Free Will Remains a Mystery: The Eighth Philosophical Perspectives Lecture’, Philosophical Perspectives, 14, pp. 1–19. Available at: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2676119.
Pryor, J. (no date) ‘Reading a Philosophy Paper’. Available at: http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/guidelines/reading.html.
Raz, J. (1986) The morality of freedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198248075.001.0001.
Scanlon, T. (1998) What we owe to each other. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Available at: http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/detail.action?docID=6233995.
Smart, J.J.C. (2003) ‘“Free Will, Praise and Blame”’, in Free will. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Smilansky, S. (2000) Free will and illusion. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Strawson, G. (2002) ‘The Bounds of Freedom’, in The Oxford handbook of free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-19.
Strawson, G. (2003) ‘“The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility”’, in Free will. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Strawson, G. (2010) Freedom and belief. Rev. ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247493.001.0001.
Strawson, P. (2003a) ‘“Freedom and Resentment”’, in Free will. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Strawson, P. (2003b) ‘“Freedom and Resentment”’, in Free will. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tadros, V. (2005) Criminal responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199225828.001.0001.
Van Inwagen, P. (1983a) An essay on free will. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Van Inwagen, P. (1983b) An essay on free will. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Vargas, M. (2004) ‘“Libertarianism and Skepticism about Free Will: Some Arguments against Both”’, Philosophical Topics, 32(1), pp. 403–426. Available at: https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/43154445.
Velleman, J.D. (2015) ‘Epistemic Freedom’, in The possibility of practical reason. Second. Ann Arbor, Michigan.: Michigan Publishing, pp. 46–72.
Vihvelin, K. (no date) ‘Arguments for Incompatibilism’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, [Preprint]. Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/.
Wallace, R.J. (1994) Responsibility and the moral sentiments. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Wallace, R.J. (2006) Normativity and the will: selected papers on moral psychology and practical reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Available at: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/detail.action?docID=422953.
Watson, G. (2003a) ‘“Free Agency”’, in Free will. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Watson, G. (2003b) Free will. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Watson, G. (2003c) ‘“Introduction”’, in Free will. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Watson, G. (2004) Agency and answerability: selected essays. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Available at: http://idpproxy.reading.ac.uk/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272273.001.0001.
Widerker, D. (2003) ‘“Libertarianism and Frankfurt’s Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities”’, in Free will. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Widerker, D. and McKenna, M. (2006) Moral responsibility and alternative possibilities: essays on the importance of alternative possibilities. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Wiggins, D. (2003) ‘“Towards a Reasonable Libertarianism”’, in Free will. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williams, B.A.O. (1993) Shame and necessity. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Wolf, S. (2003) ‘“Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility”’, in Free will. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.