Alfred R. Mele, ‘A Critique of Pereboom’s “Four-Case Argument” for Incompatibilism’, Analysis, 65/1 (2005), 75–80 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/3329340?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents>
Alfred R. Mele and David Robb, ‘Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases’, The Philosophical Review, 107/1 (1998), 97–112 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2998316?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents>
Aune, Bruce, and Keith Lehrer, ‘'Cans and Ifs: An Exchange’’, in Free Will (Oxford, 1982)
Austin, J. L., ‘“A Plea for Excuses”’, in Philosophical Papers, ed. by J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock., 3rd ed (Oxford, 1979) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019283021X.001.0001>
Ayer, J., ‘“Freedom and Necessity”’, in Free Will (Oxford, 1982)
Beebee, Helen, ‘Smilansky’s Alleged Refutation of Compatibilism’, Analysis (Oxford), 68/3 (2008), 258–60 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/25597892>
Berofsky, Bernard, ‘“Ifs, Cans, and Free Will: The Isssues”’, in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford, 2011) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.001.0001>
———, ‘Ifs, Cans, and Free Will: The Issues’, in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (Oxford, 2002) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-8>
Bilgrami, Akeel, Self-Knowledge and Resentment, First Harvard University Press paperback edition (Cambridge, Mass, 2012)
———, Self-Knowledge and Resentment, First Harvard University Press paperback edition (Cambridge, Mass, 2012)
Boxer, K. E., Rethinking Responsibility (Oxford, 2013) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695324.001.0001>
Carl Ginet, ‘In Defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: Why I Don’t Find Frankfurt’s Argument Convincing’, Philosophical Perspectives, 10 (1996), 403–17 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2216254?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents>
Chisholm, Roderick M., ‘“Human Freedom and the Self”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford, 2003)
Clarke, Randolph, ‘Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-theories/>
Clarke, Randolph, ‘Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-theories/>
———, ‘“Toward a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free Will”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford, 2003)
Corrado, Michael Louis, Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law: A Collection of Essays (New York, 1994)
Darwall, Stephen L., The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability (Cambridge, Mass, 2006)
David Widerker, ‘Frankfurt’s Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: A Further Look’, Philosophical Perspectives, 14 (2000), 181–201 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2676128?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents>
Dennett, Daniel C., Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting (Oxford, 1984)
Derk Pereboom, ‘Alternative Possibilities and Causal Histories’, Philosophical Perspectives, 14 (2000), 119–37 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2676125?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents>
Douglas Husak, ‘On the Supposed Priority of Justification to Excuse’, Law and Philosophy, 24/6 (2005), 557–94 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/30040364?pq-origsite=summon>
Duff, R. A., ‘“What Kind of Responsibility Must Criminal Law Presuppose?”’, in Free Will and Modern Science (Oxford, 2011) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.5871/bacad/9780197264898.001.0001>
Edited by Robert Kane, ‘Bernstein Fatalism’, in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will <http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com.idpproxy.reading.ac.uk/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-3>
———, ‘Haji Compatibilist Views of Freedom and Responsibility’, in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will <http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com.idpproxy.reading.ac.uk/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-9>
———, ‘Introduction: The Contours of Contemporary Free Will Debates’, in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-1>
———, ‘Widerker Responsibility and Frankfurt-Type Examples’, in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will <http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com.idpproxy.reading.ac.uk/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-14>
Ekstrom, Laura Waddell, Free Will: A Philosophical Study (Boulder, Colo, 2000)
———, ‘Libertarianism and Frankfurt-Style Cases’, in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (Oxford, 2002) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-13>
Eshleman, Andrew, ‘Moral Responsibility’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility/>
Feinberg, Joel, ‘“Action and Responsibility”’, in The Philosophy of Action (London, 1968), 95–119
Finch, Alicia, ‘The Mind Argument and Libertarianism’, Mind, 107/427 (1998), 515–28 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2660112>
Fischer, John Martin, Four Views on Free Will (Malden, MA, 2007) <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/detail.action?docID=306543>
———, My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility (Oxford, 2008), 63–83 <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/detail.action?docID=272358>
Fischer, John Martin, and Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (Cambridge, 2000) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511814594>
Fisher, John Martin, ‘“Frankfurt-Style Compatibilism”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford, 2003)
Frankfurt, Harry, ‘“Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford, 2003)
———, ‘“Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford, 2003)
Gardner, John, Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law (Oxford, 2007) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239351.001.0001>
———, ‘The Gist of Excuses’, in Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law (Oxford, 2007), 121–40 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239351.001.0001>
Hart, H. L. A., and John Gardner, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law, 2nd ed (Oxford, 2008) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534777.001.0001>
Helen Beebee, ‘Reply to Huemer on the Consequence Argument’, The Philosophical Review, 111/2 (2002), 235–41 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/3182620?pq-origsite=summon>
Honderich, Ted, ‘“Determinism as True, Both Compatibilism and Incompatibilism as False, and the Real Problem”’, in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford, 2011) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.001.0001>
Horder, J., ‘Criminal Law: Between Determinism, Liberalism, and Criminal Justice’, Current Legal Problems, 49/1 (1996), 159–86
Horder, Jeremy, Excusing Crime (Oxford, 2004) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199225781.001.0001>
Huemer, Michael, ‘Van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument’, The Philosophical Review, 109/4 (2000), 525–44 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2693623>
Inwagen, Peter van, ‘“An Argument for Incompatibilism”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford, 2003)
John Martin Fischer, ‘Van Inwagen on Free Will’, The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-), 36/143 (1986), 252–60 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2219772?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents>
Kane, Robert, A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will (Oxford, 2005) <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/detail.action?docID=4963976>
———, ‘“Introduction: The Contours of Contemporary Free Will Debates”’, in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford, 2011) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.001.0001>
———, ‘“Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford, 2003)
———, The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (New York, 2002) <http://idpproxy.reading.ac.uk/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001>
Kapitan, Tomis, ‘A Master Argument for Incompatibilism?’, in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (Oxford, 2002) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-6>
———, ‘“A Master Argument for Incompatibilism?”’, in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford, 2011) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.001.0001>
L. Ekstrom, ‘Free Will, Chance, and Mystery’, Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 113/2 (2003), 153–80 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/4321354?pq-origsite=summon>
Lewis, David, ‘“Are We Free to Break the Laws?”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford, 2003)
McKenna, Michael, ‘Compatibilism’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/>
Nagel, Thomas, ‘“Freedom”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford, 2003)
———, ‘“Moral Luck”’, in Free Will (Oxford, 1982)
Nagel, Thomas, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton, N.J, 1970)
Nahmias, Eddy, ‘“Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?”,’ in Experimental Philosophy (Oxford, 2008) <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/reader.action?docID=415292&ppg=94>
Nichols, Shaun, and Joshua Knobe, ‘“Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions”’, in Experimental Philosophy (Oxford, 2008) <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/reader.action?docID=415292&ppg=118>
O’Connor, Timothy, ‘Free Will’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/>
———, ‘Libertarian Views: Dualist and Agent-Causal Theories’, in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (Oxford, 2002) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-15>
———, Persons & Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will (New York, 2002) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019515374X.001.0001>
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Ormerod, David, Karl Laird, Matthew Gibson, David Ormerod, and J. C. Smith, Smith, Hogan, and Ormerod’s Criminal Law, Seventeenth edition (Oxford, 2024) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198890942.001.0001>
Owens, David, Shaping the Normative Landscape (Oxford, 2012) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691500.001.0001>
Pereboom, Derk, Living without Free Will (Cambridge, 2001) <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/detail.action?docID=201440>
———, Living without Free Will (Cambridge, 2001) <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/detail.action?docID=201440>
Peter van Inwagen, ‘Ability and Responsibility’, The Philosophical Review, 87/2 (1978), 201–24 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2184752?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents>
———, ‘Free Will Remains a Mystery: The Eighth Philosophical Perspectives Lecture’, Philosophical Perspectives, 14 (2000), 1–19 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2676119>
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Raz, Joseph, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford, 1986) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198248075.001.0001>
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Smart, J. J. C., ‘“Free Will, Praise and Blame”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford, 2003)
Smilansky, Saul, Free Will and Illusion (Oxford, 2000)
Strawson, Galen, Freedom and Belief, Rev. ed (Oxford, 2010) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247493.001.0001>
———, ‘The Bounds of Freedom’, in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (Oxford, 2002) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-19>
———, ‘“The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford, 2003)
Strawson, Peter, ‘“Freedom and Resentment”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford, 2003)
———, ‘“Freedom and Resentment”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford, 2003)
Tadros, Victor, Criminal Responsibility (Oxford, 2005) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199225828.001.0001>
Van Inwagen, Peter, An Essay on Free Will (Oxford, 1983)
———, An Essay on Free Will (Oxford, 1983)
Vargas, Manuel, ‘“Libertarianism and Skepticism about Free Will: Some Arguments against Both”’, Philosophical Topics, 32/1 (2004), 403–26 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/43154445>
Velleman, J. David, ‘Epistemic Freedom’, in The Possibility of Practical Reason, Second (Ann Arbor, Michigan., 2015), 46–72
Vihvelin, Kadri, ‘Arguments for Incompatibilism’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/>
Wallace, R. Jay, Normativity and the Will: Selected Papers on Moral Psychology and Practical Reason (Oxford, 2006) <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/detail.action?docID=422953>
———, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Cambridge, Mass, 1994)
Watson, Gary, Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays (Oxford, 2004) <http://idpproxy.reading.ac.uk/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272273.001.0001>
———, ‘“Free Agency”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford, 2003)
———, Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford, 2003)
———, ‘“Introduction”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford, 2003)
Widerker, David, ‘“Libertarianism and Frankfurt’s Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford, 2003)
Widerker, David, and Michael McKenna, Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities (Aldershot, 2006)
Wiggins, David, ‘“Towards a Reasonable Libertarianism”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford, 2003)
Williams, Bernard Arthur Owen, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley, 1993)
Wolf, Susan, ‘“Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford, 2003)
