Alfred R. Mele, ‘A Critique of Pereboom’s “Four-Case Argument” for Incompatibilism’, Analysis, 65.1 (2005), 75–80 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/3329340?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents>
Alfred R. Mele and David Robb, ‘Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases’, The Philosophical Review, 107.1 (1998), 97–112 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2998316?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents>
Aune, Bruce, and Keith Lehrer, ‘'Cans and Ifs: An Exchange’’, in Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), Oxford readings in philosophy
Austin, J. L., ‘“A Plea for Excuses”’, in Philosophical Papers, ed. by J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock., 3rd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019283021X.001.0001>
Ayer, J., ‘“Freedom and Necessity”’, in Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), Oxford readings in philosophy
Beebee, Helen, ‘Smilansky’s Alleged Refutation of Compatibilism’, Analysis (Oxford), 68.3 (2008), 258–60 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/25597892>
Berofsky, Bernard, ‘“Ifs, Cans, and Free Will: The Isssues”’, in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), Oxford handbooks <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.001.0001>
———, ‘Ifs, Cans, and Free Will: The Issues’, in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-8>
Bilgrami, Akeel, Self-Knowledge and Resentment, First Harvard University Press paperback edition (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2012)
———, Self-Knowledge and Resentment, First Harvard University Press paperback edition (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2012)
Boxer, K. E., Rethinking Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695324.001.0001>
Carl Ginet, ‘In Defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: Why I Don’t Find Frankfurt’s Argument Convincing’, Philosophical Perspectives, 10 (1996), 403–17 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2216254?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents>
Chisholm, Roderick M., ‘“Human Freedom and the Self”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), Oxford readings in philosophy
Clarke, Randolph, ‘Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-theories/>
Clarke, Randolph, ‘Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-theories/>
———, ‘“Toward a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free Will”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), Oxford readings in philosophy
Corrado, Michael Louis, Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law: A Collection of Essays (New York: Garland Publishing, 1994), Garland studies in applied ethics
Darwall, Stephen L., The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2006)
David Widerker, ‘Frankfurt’s Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: A Further Look’, Philosophical Perspectives, 14 (2000), 181–201 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2676128?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents>
Dennett, Daniel C., Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984)
Derk Pereboom, ‘Alternative Possibilities and Causal Histories’, Philosophical Perspectives, 14 (2000), 119–37 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2676125?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents>
Douglas Husak, ‘On the Supposed Priority of Justification to Excuse’, Law and Philosophy, 24.6 (2005), 557–94 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/30040364?pq-origsite=summon>
Duff, R. A., ‘“What Kind of Responsibility Must Criminal Law Presuppose?”’, in Free Will and Modern Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), British Academy original paperbacks <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.5871/bacad/9780197264898.001.0001>
Edited by Robert Kane, ‘Bernstein Fatalism’, in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will <http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com.idpproxy.reading.ac.uk/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-3>
———, ‘Haji Compatibilist Views of Freedom and Responsibility’, in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will <http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com.idpproxy.reading.ac.uk/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-9>
———, ‘Introduction: The Contours of Contemporary Free Will Debates’, in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-1>
———, ‘Widerker Responsibility and Frankfurt-Type Examples’, in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will <http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com.idpproxy.reading.ac.uk/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-14>
Ekstrom, Laura Waddell, Free Will: A Philosophical Study (Boulder, Colo: Cumnor Hill, 2000), Focus series
———, ‘Libertarianism and Frankfurt-Style Cases’, in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-13>
Eshleman, Andrew, ‘Moral Responsibility’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility/>
Feinberg, Joel, ‘“Action and Responsibility”’, in The Philosophy of Action (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), Oxford readings in philosophy, 95–119
Finch, Alicia, ‘The Mind Argument and Libertarianism’, Mind, 107.427 (1998), 515–28 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2660112>
Fischer, John Martin, Four Views on Free Will (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub, 2007), Great debates in philosophy <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/detail.action?docID=306543>
———, My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 63–83 <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/detail.action?docID=272358>
Fischer, John Martin, and Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), Cambridge studies in philosophy and law <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511814594>
Fisher, John Martin, ‘“Frankfurt-Style Compatibilism”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), Oxford readings in philosophy
Frankfurt, Harry, ‘“Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), Oxford readings in philosophy
———, ‘“Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), Oxford readings in philosophy
Gardner, John, Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239351.001.0001>
———, ‘The Gist of Excuses’, in Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 121–40 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239351.001.0001>
Hart, H. L. A., and John Gardner, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534777.001.0001>
Helen Beebee, ‘Reply to Huemer on the Consequence Argument’, The Philosophical Review, 111.2 (2002), 235–41 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/3182620?pq-origsite=summon>
Honderich, Ted, ‘“Determinism as True, Both Compatibilism and Incompatibilism as False, and the Real Problem”’, in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), Oxford handbooks <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.001.0001>
Horder, J., ‘Criminal Law: Between Determinism, Liberalism, and Criminal Justice’, Current Legal Problems, 49.1 (1996), 159–86 <https://doi.org/10.1093/clp/49.1.159>
Horder, Jeremy, Excusing Crime (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199225781.001.0001>
Huemer, Michael, ‘Van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument’, The Philosophical Review, 109.4 (2000), 525–44 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2693623>
Inwagen, Peter van, ‘“An Argument for Incompatibilism”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), Oxford readings in philosophy
John Martin Fischer, ‘Van Inwagen on Free Will’, The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-), 36.143 (1986), 252–60 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2219772?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents>
Kane, Robert, A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), Fundamentals of philosophy series <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/detail.action?docID=4963976>
———, ‘“Introduction: The Contours of Contemporary Free Will Debates”’, in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), Oxford handbooks <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.001.0001>
———, ‘“Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), Oxford readings in philosophy
———, The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) <http://idpproxy.reading.ac.uk/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001>
Kapitan, Tomis, ‘A Master Argument for Incompatibilism?’, in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-6>
———, ‘“A Master Argument for Incompatibilism?”’, in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), Oxford handbooks <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.001.0001>
L. Ekstrom, ‘Free Will, Chance, and Mystery’, Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 113.2 (2003), 153–80 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/4321354?pq-origsite=summon>
Lewis, David, ‘“Are We Free to Break the Laws?”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), Oxford readings in philosophy
McKenna, Michael, ‘Compatibilism’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/>
Nagel, Thomas, ‘“Freedom”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), Oxford readings in philosophy
———, ‘“Moral Luck”’, in Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), Oxford readings in philosophy
Nagel, Thomas, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1970)
Nahmias, Eddy, ‘“Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?”,’ in Experimental Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/reader.action?docID=415292&ppg=94>
Nichols, Shaun, and Joshua Knobe, ‘“Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions”’, in Experimental Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/reader.action?docID=415292&ppg=118>
O’Connor, Timothy, ‘Free Will’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/>
———, ‘Libertarian Views: Dualist and Agent-Causal Theories’, in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-15>
———, Persons & Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019515374X.001.0001>
‘Online Reading Lists: A Guide for Students’ (University of Reading Library) <http://libguides.reading.ac.uk/reading-lists/students>
Ormerod, David, Karl Laird, Matthew Gibson, David Ormerod, and J. C. Smith, Smith, Hogan, and Ormerod’s Criminal Law, Seventeenth edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198890942.001.0001>
Owens, David, Shaping the Normative Landscape (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691500.001.0001>
Pereboom, Derk, Living without Free Will (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), Cambridge studies in philosophy <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/detail.action?docID=201440>
———, Living without Free Will (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), Cambridge studies in philosophy <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/detail.action?docID=201440>
Peter van Inwagen, ‘Ability and Responsibility’, The Philosophical Review, 87.2 (1978), 201–24 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2184752?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents>
———, ‘Free Will Remains a Mystery: The Eighth Philosophical Perspectives Lecture’, Philosophical Perspectives, 14 (2000), 1–19 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2676119>
Pryor, James, ‘“Reading a Philosophy Paper”’ <http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/guidelines/reading.html>
Raz, Joseph, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198248075.001.0001>
Scanlon, Thomas, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998) <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/detail.action?docID=6233995>
Smart, J. J. C., ‘“Free Will, Praise and Blame”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), Oxford readings in philosophy
Smilansky, Saul, Free Will and Illusion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000)
Strawson, Galen, Freedom and Belief, Rev. ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247493.001.0001>
———, ‘The Bounds of Freedom’, in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-19>
———, ‘“The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), Oxford readings in philosophy
Strawson, Peter, ‘“Freedom and Resentment”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), Oxford readings in philosophy
———, ‘“Freedom and Resentment”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), Oxford readings in philosophy
Tadros, Victor, Criminal Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), Oxford monographs on criminal law and justice <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199225828.001.0001>
Van Inwagen, Peter, An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983)
———, An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983)
Vargas, Manuel, ‘“Libertarianism and Skepticism about Free Will: Some Arguments against Both”’, Philosophical Topics, 32.1 (2004), 403–26 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/43154445>
Velleman, J. David, ‘Epistemic Freedom’, in The Possibility of Practical Reason, Second (Ann Arbor, Michigan.: Michigan Publishing, 2015), pp. 46–72
Vihvelin, Kadri, ‘Arguments for Incompatibilism’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/>
Wallace, R. Jay, Normativity and the Will: Selected Papers on Moral Psychology and Practical Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006) <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/detail.action?docID=422953>
———, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1994)
Watson, Gary, Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004) <http://idpproxy.reading.ac.uk/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272273.001.0001>
———, ‘“Free Agency”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), Oxford readings in philosophy
———, Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), Oxford readings in philosophy
———, ‘“Introduction”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), Oxford readings in philosophy
Widerker, David, ‘“Libertarianism and Frankfurt’s Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), Oxford readings in philosophy
Widerker, David, and Michael McKenna, Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006)
Wiggins, David, ‘“Towards a Reasonable Libertarianism”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), Oxford readings in philosophy
Williams, Bernard Arthur Owen, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), Sather classical lectures
Wolf, Susan, ‘“Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility”’, in Free Will, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), Oxford readings in philosophy
