Alfred R. Mele, ‘A Critique of Pereboom’s “Four-Case Argument” for Incompatibilism’ (2005) 65 Analysis 75 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/3329340?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents>
Alfred R. Mele and David Robb, ‘Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases’ (1998) 107 The Philosophical Review 97 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2998316?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents>
Aune B and Lehrer K, ‘'Cans and Ifs: An Exchange’’, Free will, vol Oxford readings in philosophy (Oxford University Press 1982)
Austin JL, ‘“A Plea for Excuses”’ in J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock. (eds), Philosophical papers (3rd ed, Oxford University Press 1979) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019283021X.001.0001>
Ayer J, ‘“Freedom and Necessity”’, Free will, vol Oxford readings in philosophy (Oxford University Press 1982)
Beebee H, ‘Smilansky’s Alleged Refutation of Compatibilism’ (2008) 68 Analysis (Oxford) 258 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/25597892>
Berofsky B, ‘Ifs, Cans, and Free Will: The Issues’, The Oxford handbook of free will (Oxford University Press 2002) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-8>
——, ‘“Ifs, Cans, and Free Will: The Isssues”’, The Oxford handbook of free will, vol Oxford handbooks (2nd ed, Oxford University Press 2011) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.001.0001>
Bilgrami A, Self-Knowledge and Resentment (First Harvard University Press paperback edition, Harvard University Press 2012)
——, Self-Knowledge and Resentment (First Harvard University Press paperback edition, Harvard University Press 2012)
Boxer KE, Rethinking Responsibility (Oxford University Press 2013) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695324.001.0001>
Carl Ginet, ‘In Defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: Why I Don’t Find Frankfurt’s Argument Convincing’ (1996) 10 Philosophical Perspectives 403 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2216254?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents>
Chisholm RM, ‘“Human Freedom and the Self”’, Free will, vol Oxford readings in philosophy (2nd ed, Oxford University Press 2003)
Clarke R, ‘“Toward a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free Will”’, Free will, vol Oxford readings in philosophy (2nd ed, Oxford University Press 2003)
——, ‘Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will’ Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-theories/>
Clarke, Randolph, ‘Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will’ Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-theories/>
Corrado ML, Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law: A Collection of Essays, vol Garland studies in applied ethics (Garland Publishing 1994)
Darwall SL, The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability (Harvard University Press 2006)
David Widerker, ‘Frankfurt’s Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: A Further Look’ (2000) 14 Philosophical Perspectives 181 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2676128?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents>
Dennett DC, Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting (Clarendon Press 1984)
Derk Pereboom, ‘Alternative Possibilities and Causal Histories’ (2000) 14 Philosophical Perspectives 119 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2676125?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents>
Douglas Husak, ‘On the Supposed Priority of Justification to Excuse’ (2005) 24 Law and Philosophy 557 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/30040364?pq-origsite=summon>
Duff RA, ‘“What Kind of Responsibility Must Criminal Law Presuppose?”’, Free will and modern science, vol British Academy original paperbacks (Oxford University Press 2011) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.5871/bacad/9780197264898.001.0001>
Edited by Robert Kane, ‘Bernstein Fatalism’, The Oxford Handbook of Free Will <http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com.idpproxy.reading.ac.uk/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-3>
——, ‘Haji Compatibilist Views of Freedom and Responsibility’, The Oxford Handbook of Free Will <http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com.idpproxy.reading.ac.uk/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-9>
——, ‘Introduction: The Contours of Contemporary Free Will Debates’, The Oxford Handbook of Free Will <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-1>
——, ‘Widerker Responsibility and Frankfurt-Type Examples’, The Oxford Handbook of Free Will <http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com.idpproxy.reading.ac.uk/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-14>
Ekstrom LW, Free Will: A Philosophical Study, vol Focus series (Cumnor Hill 2000)
——, ‘Libertarianism and Frankfurt-Style Cases’, The Oxford handbook of free will (Oxford University Press 2002) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-13>
Eshleman A, ‘Moral Responsibility’ Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility/>
Feinberg J, ‘“Action and Responsibility”’, The Philosophy of action, vol Oxford readings in philosophy (Oxford University Press 1968)
Finch A, ‘The Mind Argument and Libertarianism’ (1998) 107 Mind 515 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2660112>
Fischer JM, Four Views on Free Will, vol Great debates in philosophy (Blackwell Pub 2007) <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/detail.action?docID=306543>
——, My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility (Oxford University Press 2008) 63 <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/detail.action?docID=272358>
Fischer JM and Ravizza M, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility, vol Cambridge studies in philosophy and law (Cambridge University Press 2000) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511814594>
Fisher JM, ‘“Frankfurt-Style Compatibilism”’, Free will, vol Oxford readings in philosophy (2nd ed, Oxford University Press 2003)
Frankfurt H, ‘“Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”’, Free will, vol Oxford readings in philosophy (2nd ed, Oxford University Press 2003)
——, ‘“Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”’, Free will, vol Oxford readings in philosophy (2nd ed, Oxford University Press 2003)
Gardner J, Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2007) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239351.001.0001>
——, ‘The Gist of Excuses’, Offences and defences: selected essays in the philosophy of criminal law (Oxford University Press 2007) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239351.001.0001>
Hart HLA and Gardner J, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (2nd ed, Oxford University Press 2008) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534777.001.0001>
Helen Beebee, ‘Reply to Huemer on the Consequence Argument’ (2002) 111 The Philosophical Review 235 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/3182620?pq-origsite=summon>
Honderich T, ‘“Determinism as True, Both Compatibilism and Incompatibilism as False, and the Real Problem”’, The Oxford handbook of free will, vol Oxford handbooks (2nd ed, Oxford University Press 2011) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.001.0001>
Horder J, ‘Criminal Law: Between Determinism, Liberalism, and Criminal Justice’ (1996) 49 Current Legal Problems 159
Horder J, Excusing Crime (Oxford University Press 2004) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199225781.001.0001>
Huemer M, ‘Van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument’ (2000) 109 The Philosophical review 525 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2693623>
Inwagen P van, ‘“An Argument for Incompatibilism”’, Free will, vol Oxford readings in philosophy (2nd ed, Oxford University Press 2003)
John Martin Fischer, ‘Van Inwagen on Free Will’ (1986) 36 The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-) 252 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2219772?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents>
Kane R, The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (Oxford University Press 2002) <http://idpproxy.reading.ac.uk/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001>
——, ‘“Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism”’, Free will, vol Oxford readings in philosophy (2nd ed, Oxford University Press 2003)
——, A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, vol Fundamentals of philosophy series (Oxford University Press 2005) <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/detail.action?docID=4963976>
——, ‘“Introduction: The Contours of Contemporary Free Will Debates”’, The Oxford handbook of free will, vol Oxford handbooks (2nd ed, Oxford University Press 2011) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.001.0001>
Kapitan T, ‘A Master Argument for Incompatibilism?’, The Oxford handbook of free will (Oxford University Press 2002) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-6>
——, ‘“A Master Argument for Incompatibilism?”’, The Oxford handbook of free will, vol Oxford handbooks (2nd ed, Oxford University Press 2011) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.001.0001>
L. Ekstrom, ‘Free Will, Chance, and Mystery’ (2003) 113 Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 153 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/4321354?pq-origsite=summon>
Lewis D, ‘“Are We Free to Break the Laws?”’, Free will, vol Oxford readings in philosophy (2nd ed, Oxford University Press 2003)
McKenna M, ‘Compatibilism’ Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/>
Nagel T, ‘“Moral Luck”’, Free will, vol Oxford readings in philosophy (Oxford University Press 1982)
——, ‘“Freedom”’, Free will, vol Oxford readings in philosophy (2nd ed, Oxford University Press 2003)
Nagel, Thomas, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton University Press 1970)
Nahmias E, ‘“Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?”,’ Experimental philosophy (Oxford University Press 2008) <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/reader.action?docID=415292&ppg=94>
Nichols S and Knobe J, ‘“Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions”’, Experimental philosophy (Oxford University Press 2008) <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/reader.action?docID=415292&ppg=118>
O’Connor T, ‘Libertarian Views: Dualist and Agent-Causal Theories’, The Oxford handbook of free will (Oxford University Press 2002) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-15>
——, Persons & Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will (Oxford University Press 2002) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019515374X.001.0001>
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Ormerod D and others, Smith, Hogan, and Ormerod’s Criminal Law (Seventeenth edition, Oxford University Press 2024) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=https://doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198890942.001.0001>
Owens D, Shaping the Normative Landscape (Oxford University Press 2012) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691500.001.0001>
Pereboom D, Living without Free Will, vol Cambridge studies in philosophy (Cambridge University Press 2001) <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/detail.action?docID=201440>
——, Living without Free Will, vol Cambridge studies in philosophy (Cambridge University Press 2001) <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/detail.action?docID=201440>
Peter van Inwagen, ‘Ability and Responsibility’ (1978) 87 The Philosophical Review 201 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2184752?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents>
——, ‘Free Will Remains a Mystery: The Eighth Philosophical Perspectives Lecture’ (2000) 14 Philosophical Perspectives 1 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2676119>
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Smart JJC, ‘“Free Will, Praise and Blame”’, Free will, vol Oxford readings in philosophy (2nd ed, Oxford University Press 2003)
Smilansky S, Free Will and Illusion (Clarendon Press 2000)
Strawson G, ‘The Bounds of Freedom’, The Oxford handbook of free will (Oxford University Press 2002) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548-e-19>
——, ‘“The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility”’, Free will, vol Oxford readings in philosophy (2nd ed, Oxford University Press 2003)
——, Freedom and Belief (Rev ed, Oxford University Press 2010) <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247493.001.0001>
Strawson P, ‘“Freedom and Resentment”’, Free will, vol Oxford readings in philosophy (2nd ed, Oxford University Press 2003)
——, ‘“Freedom and Resentment”’, Free will, vol Oxford readings in philosophy (2nd ed, Oxford University Press 2003)
Tadros V, Criminal Responsibility, vol Oxford monographs on criminal law and justice (Oxford University Press 2005) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199225828.001.0001>
Van Inwagen P, An Essay on Free Will (Clarendon Press 1983)
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Vargas M, ‘“Libertarianism and Skepticism about Free Will: Some Arguments against Both”’ (2004) 32 Philosophical Topics 403 <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/reading.ac.uk?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/43154445>
Velleman JD, ‘Epistemic Freedom’, The possibility of practical reason (Second, Michigan Publishing 2015)
Vihvelin K, ‘Arguments for Incompatibilism’ Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/>
Wallace RJ, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Harvard University Press 1994)
——, Normativity and the Will: Selected Papers on Moral Psychology and Practical Reason (Clarendon Press 2006) <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/reading/detail.action?docID=422953>
Watson G, ‘“Free Agency”’, Free will, vol Oxford readings in philosophy (2nd ed, Oxford University Press 2003)
——, Free Will, vol Oxford readings in philosophy (2nd ed, Oxford University Press 2003)
——, ‘“Introduction”’, Free will, vol Oxford readings in philosophy (2nd ed, Oxford University Press 2003)
——, Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays (Clarendon Press 2004) <http://idpproxy.reading.ac.uk/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272273.001.0001>
Widerker D, ‘“Libertarianism and Frankfurt’s Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities”’, Free will, vol Oxford readings in philosophy (2nd ed, Oxford University Press 2003)
Widerker D and McKenna M, Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities (Ashgate 2006)
Wiggins D, ‘“Towards a Reasonable Libertarianism”’, Free will, vol Oxford readings in philosophy (2nd ed, Oxford University Press 2003)
Williams BAO, Shame and Necessity, vol Sather classical lectures (University of California Press 1993)
Wolf S, ‘“Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility”’, Free will, vol Oxford readings in philosophy (2nd ed, Oxford University Press 2003)
